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CALIFORNIA ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW 1994
The Ethics Year in Review is a survey of the past year's
developments in the field of California legal ethics. Each
Year in Review reviews the preceding year's legal develop-
ments within the following categories: California legislation
regarding professional responsibility, ethics opinions promul-
gated by the ABA, the State Bar of California and other local
bar associations, California judicial decisions, and changes to
the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The goal of the
Year in Review is to provide the legal practitioner with a
thorough yet concise overview of the major developments in
the field of California legal ethics. It should be noted that the
Year in Review covers, in addition to issues solely relating to
the interpretation and application of ethical rules and guide-
lines, other issues relating more generally to the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.
I. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION REGARDING
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Judicial Discipline Bill
On November 8, 1994, California voters approved Propo-
sition 190 by a wide margin.' This proposition significantly
reformed the Commission on Judicial Performance, which is
the body charged with evaluating the conduct of, and disci-
plining, all California judges.2
1. How Proposition 190 Changed the Commission
Proposition 190 amended the state Constitution to in-
crease the membership of the Commission from nine to
eleven. Whereas previously the Commission was made up of
five judges, two lawyers, and two members of the public, the
Commission will now be composed of six members of the pub-
1. Final California Election Results / Statewide Offices, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1994, at A23. The measure passed by a margin of 64% to 36%. Id.
2. See, e.g., J. Clark Kelso, Don't Forget, It's Still the People's Court, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at B7 (Prop. 190 will "radically restructure and reform" the
Commission).
3. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a); Improve the Courts, supra note 3, at A22.
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lic, two lawyers and three judges. 4 The members of the Com-
mission, with the exception of the three judges, are to be cho-
sen by either the governor, the speaker of the Assembly, or
the Senate Rules Committee. 5 As a result of this change,
members of the public will now constitute a majority of the
Commission, and judges will constitute a distinct minority.
Before Proposition 190, the Commission operated in the
strictest secrecy.6 It was authorized either to privately ad-
monish judges or to recommend to the California Supreme
Court that a judge be censured or removed from office. 7 Prop-
osition 190, however, now requires that all proceedings of the
Commission be open to public review once the Commission
files formal charges of misconduct against a judge', and gives
the Commission authority to remove a judge, subject to re-
view by the California Supreme Court.9
There were other significant features in Proposition 190.
The Commission was given power to make rules for the inves-
tigation of judges. 10 The measure stripped the California
Judges Association of the power to amend, or adopt new pro-
visions of, the Code of Judicial Ethics, and granted this power
to the California Supreme Court.'1 The Supreme Court was
also given discretionary authority to review Commission de-
terminations. 12 A Commission decision, however, is final if
the Court does not act within 120 days.' 3
2. Arguments in Favor of Proposition 190
Proponents of Proposition 190 emphasized the beneficial
effects of opening the judicial discipline process to the pub-
lic.14 They contended that judges have not been seriously dis-
4. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Bill Ainsworth, Judges Can't Slow Discipline Bill, THE RE-
CORDER, June 16, 1994, p. 1 (charge by critics that system is "so secretive that it
insulates and protects judges from being punished for their behavior").
7. Former CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8(b)-(c). The Commission could open
hearings to the public if the charges involved "moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption." Id. § 18(f)(3).
8. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(j).
9. Id. § 18(d).
10. Id. § 18(i)(1).
11. Id. § 18(m); Anne Krueger, Even Enemies of Prop. 190 Agree: Judicial
Discipline Reform Overdue, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Oct. 6, 1994, at A3.
12. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(d).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Improve the Courts, supra note 3, at A22.
1070 [Vol. 35
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
ciplined by the judge-dominated Commission, despite egre-
gious ethical violations. 15 It was pointed out that, though the
number of complaints against judges rose from 260 in 1980 to
950 in 1993, the number of cases in which discipline was im-
posed only increased from nine to sixteen for the same pe-
riod.16 The measure will "enable the public to assess for it-
self" the process of disciplining judges who behave
unethically. 1 7 Furthermore, opening up the process will put
an end to the "misguided cloak of secrecy" which has led to
"public cynicism and mistrust of the state's judiciary."18
Stripping the judges of the power to adopt judicial ethical
rules would put a halt to the California Judges Association's
practice of diluting the force of such rules, thereby ending
"California's singular practice of adopting ethics by a private
interest group."19
3. Arguments Against Proposition 190
Though the opponents of Proposition 190 did not succeed
in convincing voters to defeat the measure, they did raise sig-
nificant questions concerning its possible impact on the judi-
cial discipline process. One objection frequently voiced con-
cerned the manner in which the measure injected politics into
the Commission.2 ° On the new eleven member panel, eight of
the members will be appointed by politicians instead of
judges-creating a politically appointed majority which could
"gang up" on the three-judge minority. 21 Therefore, the
temptation for politicians to "choose appointees with a polit-
ical agenda is clear and unrestrained."22
15. See, e.g., Harriet Chiang, Voters Expected to OK Judicial Discipline
Overhaul, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1994, at A17 ("Judges who have made racist
remarks in the courtroom or accepted gifts from lawyers and clients have gotten
away with a mere slap on the wrist").
16. 190: Overhaul of Judges' Discipline Panel; What It Is, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1994, at W1l.
17. Id.
18. Improve the Courts, supra note 3, at A22.
19. See Krueger, supra note 11 (quoting San Diego Superior Court Judge
Terry O'Rourke).
20. See Overhaul, supra note 16.
21. Id.
22. Jeremy Fogel, Fatal Flaws in Prop. 190 Court Reform, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 31, 1994, at B7. Fogel points out that, under the revamped system, a
"single political party, if it controlled both the Legislature and the governor's
office, could use the Commission's disciplinary powers to advance its own polit-
ical goals." Id.
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Furthermore, the dangers inherent in the politicizing of
the Commission would be compounded by the enormous
power given to the Commission to remove or suspend
judges.23 Though the Supreme Court can review disciplinary
decisions of the Commission, this right of review is lost if the
Court does not act within 120 days.24 Such dangers would be
enhanced due to the fact that the Commission is given broad
power to "write its own rules and decide who and how, under
these rules, to prosecute, judge and punish."25 It would,
therefore, be a simple matter for the Commission to "get rid
of a judge because he or she bucked a political agenda."26
4. Potential Challenges to the Revamped Commission
The objections which have been voiced against Proposi-
tion 190, and the concerns expressed by the measure's oppo-
nents must be taken seriously.27 In fact, given the enormous
power granted to the Commission on Judicial Performance by
Proposition 190, it would not be unexpected for the revamped
system to be the subject of numerous legal challenges.
One aspect of the new system which might be challenged
is the public nature of the Commission's disciplinary hear-
ings. The likelihood of success of such a challenge, however,
does not appear to be strong given the California Supreme
Court's ruling in G. Dennis Adams v. Commission on Judicial
Performance.28 In that case, the Court ruled that Superior
Court Judge G. Dennis Adams' fundamental constitutional
rights were not violated by a 1993 order of the Commission to
open the disciplinary hearings against him to the public.29
23. Id.
24. Id.; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(d).
25. See Overhaul, supra note 16.
26. Judge Joseph A. Wapner (Retired), Judicial Reform Propositions, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994, at B7.
27. Unfortunately, serious objections to the measure by such organizations
as the California Judges Association were often dismissed by proponents sum-
marily by solely focusing on the self-interest or previous inaction of such
groups. See, e.g., Improve the Courts, supra note 3, at A22 ("The judges' denun-
ciation of the Commission's closed-door culture comes too late. Decades have
passed with no peep from the jurists that they were willing to reform their dis-
ciplinary process").
28. 882 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1994).
29. Id. at 376-77. Due to a measure passed by voters in 1988, the Commis-
sion on Judicial Performance had discretion to open hearings against a judge if
the charges involved "dishonesty, corruption or moral turpitude." Former CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 18(f)(3). Due to Proposition 190, of course, this measure is
[Vol. 351072
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
The Court stated that "the determination to open a discipli-
nary proceeding before the Commission does not impinge
upon any fundamental right of the subject judge."3 ° Since no
fundamental right to a closed hearing existed, the Court ana-
lyzed Adams' equal protection and right to privacy claims
under the rational basis standard.3 1 The opening of a disci-
plinary proceeding was found to be rationally related to the
legitimate governmental purpose of promoting public confi-
dence in the judiciary. 2
The Court's blanket statement that an open disciplinary
proceeding does not "impinge upon any fundamental right" of
a judge appears to doom any chance of a successful challenge
to the open hearing provisions of Proposition 190 on right of
privacy, equal protection, or due process grounds. The Court
will likely evaluate such constitutional claims under the ra-
tional basis standard, and it will be difficult to succeed with
the argument that opening all formal proceedings to the pub-
lic is not rationally related to the legitimate governmental
purpose of promoting public confidence.
There is, however, one extremely significant difference
between the open hearing order challenged in Adams and the
Proposition 190 provisions. The latter mandate an open
hearing whenever any formal charges against a judge are in-
stituted, with no consideration as to the seriousness of the
charges, or the existence of extenuating circumstances. 33 The
Court referred approvingly, in Adams, to the fact that the
Commission, under the then existing scheme, retained "the
authority to maintain the confidentiality of proceedings and
thus to have an entirely private admonishment in the event it
concludes that public confidence and the interests of justice
would not be served by an open hearing."34 In contrast,
under the revamped system, the Commission could not close
the hearing if formal charges have been filed, even if it de-
cided that "public confidence and the interests of justice
would not be served" by opening the hearing. Therefore, it is
now superfluous, for all hearings against judges will be public as soon as any
charges are filed. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(j).
30. G. Dennis Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 882 P.2d
358, 376 (Cal. 1994).
31. Id. at 377.
32. Id.
33. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(j).
34. G. Dennis Adams, 882 P.2d at 371-72.
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possible that the Court would disapprove of Proposition 190's
open hearing provisions on the ground that the ability of the
Commission to, in its discretion, protect the public and the
"interests of justice" has been wholly stripped away.
Another challenge to Proposition 190 could be made on
separation of powers grounds. One commentator, in fact, has
deemed it "all but certain" that such a lawsuit will be
brought.35 However, such a suit would likely prove unsuc-
cessful as well, because a similar claim was rejected by the
California Supreme Court in the Adams case."6 Adams had
claimed that the Commission's powers to open hearings and
to determine whether formal charges against a judge in-
volved moral turpitude were an exercise of judicial power,
and that vesting such judicial power in an administrative
agency violated the separation of powers clause in the Cali-
fornia Constitution. 7 The Court stated that, even assuming
that the powers vested in the Commission were "judicial-like"
functions, the judge's claim had no merit.38 It pointed out
that the separation of powers clause forbids the intermin-
gling of legislative, executive, or judicial power except as per-
mitted by the Constitution3 9 Because the Commission was
set up as a "constitutionally independent body" expressly au-
thorized by the Constitution itself to exercise the challenged
judicial-like powers, the Court held that the strictures of the
separations of powers clause did not apply.40
Thus, the Court has already rejected the claim that con-
stitutional authorization for the Commission to perform judi-
cial functions constitutes an unconstitutional usurpation of
judicial power. Because Proposition 190 consisted of changes
to the California Constitution itself, any claim that its provi-
sions must be struck down on separation of powers grounds
would likely fail under the Adams rationale.
B. Summary of Legislation Enacted in 1994
Presented below is a summary of significant California
legislation enacted in 1994 regarding professional responsi-
35. See Overhaul, supra note 16.
36. G. Dennis Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 882 P.2d
358, 369-70 (Cal. 1994).
37. Id. at 369.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 369-70.
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bility and conduct. The summary is not intended to be com-
prehensive, but merely to highlight the more significant legis-
lative developments occurring over the past year. Note that
the brief descriptions of the legislation provided refer only to
those sections which concern legal ethics.
1. SB 254, approved by Governor on Sept. 26, 199441
Requires the State Bar to submit to the Supreme Court
for approval, by March 1, 1995, a rule of professional conduct
governing trial publicity and extrajudicial statements made
by attorneys that concern adjudicative proceedings.
2. SB 1718, not yet approved by Governor
42
Requirement that student at nonaccredited law school
pass examination as condition of receiving credit for first year
of study eliminated; such students only required to take the
examination; examining committee shall notify a student
who has taken the examination of what his or her score sug-
gests about the student's probability of becoming attorney;
student may continue legal studies as long as he satisfies the
law school's academic standards; State Bar shall publish sta-
tistics for first-year law students' examination as it does for
General Bar Examination.
3. AB 2662, approved by Governor on July 9, 199441
Information transmitted by facsimile, cellular radio tele-
phone, or cordless telephone between attorney and client is
confidential.
4. AB 2928, approved by Governor on July 9, 199444
Attorney complained against shall receive exculpatory
evidence from the State Bar after initiation of disciplinary
proceeding in State Bar Court, and thereafter whenever such
evidence is discovered and available; disclosure of mitigating
evidence not required.
41. Cal. S.B. 254, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
42. Cal. S.B. 1718, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
43. Cal. A.B. 2662, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
44. Cal. A.B. 2928, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
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5. AB 3219, approved by Governor on Sept. 10, 1994"5
Concerns (1) provisions regarding mediation of com-
plaints against attorneys: State Bar rules regarding imple-
mentation of alternative dispute resolution discipline media-
tion program may authorize mediation to proceed under
programs sponsored by local bar associations; Board of Gov-
ernors of State Bar may establish a system and procedure for
mediation of attorney fee disputes which would be voluntary,
and in which discussions and offers of settlement in media-
tion would be confidential; (2) provisions regarding fee con-
tracts: attorney must provide client with duplicate copy of fee
contract at time contract is entered into; fee contract must
include any basis for attorney compensation; (3) provisions
regarding attorney fee disputes: if client waives right to arbi-
tration over fee dispute by proceeding with action, parties
may thereafter stipulate to set aside waiver and proceed with
arbitration; small claims court given jurisdiction to confirm,
correct, or vacate a fee arbitration award not exceeding
$5,000, or to conduct hearing de novo between attorney and
client if amount in controversy is not more than $5,000.
6. AB 3432, approved by Governor on Sept. 11, 199446
Authorizes cities and/or counties to require attorneys
qualified as lobbyists to register and disclose lobbying activi-
ties directed toward those jurisdictions' local agencies to the
same extent as nonattorney lobbyists; any lobbying prohibi-
tions enacted by local jurisdiction must also apply to attorney
lobbyists; local jurisdictions may require disclosure of speci-
fied information concerning a lobbyist.
7. AB 3638, approved by Governor on Sept. 30, 199447
Limitations imposed on the amount of gifts that may be
accepted by judges; judge cannot accept gifts from any single
source in any year with total value of more than $250; judges
prohibited from accepting any honorarium; Commission on
Judicial Performance required to enforce new rules.
45. Cal. A.B. 3219, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
46. Cal. A.B. 3432, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
47. Cal. A.B. 3638, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
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8. AB 3659, approved by Governor on Sept. 21, 199448
Concerns (1) provisions regarding lawyer referral serv-
ices: provides that the State Bar may require that applica-
tion and renewal fees for lawyer referral services be deter-
mined by consideration of specified factors; attorney referral
services must establish separate activities to serve persons of
limited financial means; anyone having an ownership inter-
est in a lawyer referral service that violates provisions gov-
erning such services shall be civilly liable, (2) provisions re-
garding attorney advertising: provides that a spokesperson
may be used in advertising so long as there is no suggestion
that spokesperson is advertising attorney, and spokesper-
son's title is disclosed; advertisement in electronic media may
not be false, misleading, or deceptive, and message must be
factually substantiated; rebuttable presumption that certain
messages are false, misleading, or deceptive; certain informa-
tion presumed to not be misleading or deceptive when
presented in electronic media advertising; certain disclosures
must be made in electronic media advertising that portrays a
result in a particular case; procedure created for administra-
tive investigation of attorney advertising complaints filed
with State Bar against Bar members and lawyer referral
services.
II. CALIFORNIA AND ABA ADVISORY ETHICS
COMMITTEE OPINIONS
The opinions summarized below were issued from the
ABA and various California advisory ethics committees dur-
ing 1994. Each opinion is advisory only, and is not binding on
the courts, the State Bar of California, its Board of Gover-
nors, any person or tribunal charged with regulatory respon-
sibility, or any other member of the State Bar. There were no
advisory ethics opinions published in 1994 by the Bar Associ-
ation of San Francisco.
48. Cal. A.B. 3659, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994).
10771995]
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A. The State Bar of California Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct
1. Formal Opinion No. 1994-13449
A client has informed an attorney of the client's intention
to terminate the attorney's employment, and to replace him
or her with successor counsel. No substitution of counsel
form has been filed, but the original attorney has neverthe-
less been requested to deliver the client file to the client or
successor counsel immediately. Would the attorney act ethi-
cally in retaining the client file until the substitution form is
filed?
The opinion first notes that, even though the client has
informed the attorney of the client's intention to discharge
the attorney, the attorney remains the attorney of record un-
til the substitution of counsel form is filed. Until that time,
the attorney has the same duty under California Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 3-1105o to represent the client competently
as existed before the discharge. Undoubtedly, competent rep-
resentation of a client will often require possession of the cli-
ent file. However, Rule 3-500 (an attorney must "keep a cli-
ent reasonably informed") and Business & Professions Code
Section 6068(m)(attorney must "promptly comply with rea-
sonable requests for information") also require the attorney
to make the client file available to the client or prospective
new counsel at all reasonable times.
It would appear, therefore, that the attorney may face
conflicting obligations once the client or successor counsel de-
mands the file, because the attorney may not be able to repre-
sent the client competently unless the client file is kept. The
opinion resolves this difficulty by stating that the attorney
may retain possession and control of the file only if it is neces-
sary to do so in order to represent the client competently and
fulfill the attorney's outstanding obligations to a tribunal
before which a client matter is pending. However, an attor-
ney cannot withhold the client file from the client or succes-
sor counsel merely to await the technicality of formal with-
49. State Bar Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 1994-134 (1994).
50. All further references are to the California Rules of Professional Con-
duct unless otherwise indicated.
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drawal, or hold the file in order to obtain payment or other
consideration from the client.
This opinion discusses and interprets Rules 3-110, 3-300,
3-500, 3-700(A), and 3-700(D) of the California Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, and Section 6068 of the California Busi-
ness and Professions Code.
2. Formal Opinion No. 1994-13561
This opinion deals with the common situation wherein
an attorney desires to "cash-out" his or her fee at the time of
settlement, instead of receiving his percentage of the client's
settlement payments over the course of many years. The
opinion first notes that, if the fee agreement originally en-
tered into between attorney and client is silent as to the
method that attorney's fees shall be paid under a structured
settlement, the attorney can only receive fees on a conven-
tional pro rata basis. In other words, the attorney cannot
agree to a settlement whereby he or she receives his fee up
front unless such a possibility is provided for in the client fee
agreement.
The attorney can contract with the client to receive the
entire fee at the time of settlement. However, the opinion
makes clear that such a contract will be scrutinized closely
under Rule 4-200 (unconscionable fees) and Rule 3-300 (at-
torneys having pecuniary or possessory interests adverse to
their clients). In addition, such a contract must be in writing,
signed, and in compliance with Business and Professions
Code Section 6147. Compliance with Section 6147 requires
that the attorney include a statement in the contract specify-
ing how the payment of attorney's fees up front will affect the
client's recovery.
This opinion discusses and interprets Rules 3-300, 3-500,
3-510, and 4-200 of the California Rules of Professional Con-
duct, and Section 6147 of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code.
51. State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility
and Conduct, Formal Op. 1994-135 (1994).
10791995]
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B. Los Angeles County Bar Association Professional
Responsibility and Ethics Committee
1. Opinion No. 47652
An attorney has represented a wife in a marital dissolu-
tion proceeding. The retainer agreement provides that the
attorney's services will not include appeals or execution on
any judgment obtained at the trial level. The case is settled
at the trial level, but opposing counsel fails to prepare a judg-
ment as required by the settlement. The client does not wish
for the attorney to prepare the judgment unless the attorney
agrees to do so free of charge. In addition, the client still
owes the attorney $4,500 in previously earned fees, which she
proposes to satisfy by assigning to the attorney the right to
collect unpaid spousal support and a separate cause of action
against the former husband. The attorney does not want to
accept these proposals. The issues involved are (1) whether
the attorney is ethically obligated to continue to represent the
client on a matter (preparing the judgment) which falls
outside the terms of the retainer agreements, and (2) whether
an ethical conflict has developed between the attorney and
client as a result of the fee dispute.
As to the first issue, the opinion states that an attorney
has no general ethical obligation to represent the client on
matters which fall outside the parameters of the retainer
agreement. The only major limitation on this principle is
that the attorney cannot withdraw from representation until
appropriate steps are taken to avoid prejudice to the client's
rights, i.e. giving due notice of the withdrawal to the client,
allowing time for the client to employ other counsel, re-
turning client property and papers, etc. There may be, in ad-
dition, local rules or state statutes which impose additional
requirements for the withdrawal of representation.
As to the second issue, the opinion states that the attor-
ney could not institute a civil action against the current client
without creating an impermissible conflict of interest. The
attorney must first terminate representation of the client
before any legal action can be taken to collect the unpaid fees.
The attorney cannot, in addition, condition performance of
52. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Professional Responsibility and Ethics Comm.,
Op. 476 (1994).
[Vol. 351080
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services covered under the retainer agreement upon the pay-
ment of the unpaid fees.
This opinion discusses and interprets Rules 3-310 and 3-
700 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, and Sec-
tions 284 and 285.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Opinion No. 47753
An attorney, also a licensed physician, has an ownership
or partnership interest in the medical facility in which he
practices medicine. As attorney, he or she refers his personal
injury clients to this medical facility for treatment, though he
or she does not personally treat the referred clients. Has the
attorney conducted him or herself ethically?
The opinion first states that the referral of the attorney's
clients to a medical facility in which the attorney has an own-
ership interest is a type of transaction contemplated by Rule
3-300. Because the attorney will receive a pecuniary benefit
by referring clients to the facility, the attorney will not be act-
ing solely in the client's best interest. Therefore, there is a
potential for undue influence and overreaching by the attor-
ney-exactly the sort of situation that Rule 3-300 was in-
tended to cover.
Because Rule 3-300 applies to the referral of clients to
the facility, the referral must comport with the Rule's re-
quirements. This means, first, that the referral must be fair
and reasonable to the client. For example, the attorney could
not condition representation of a client on the client's seeking
treatment at the facility. Second, the attorney must, contem-
poraneously with the referral, fully and clearly disclose to the
client his or her relationship with the facility. For example,
the attorney must inform the client that the client is not re-
quired to go to the referred facility.
The opinion also states that written disclosure to the cli-
ent of the attorney's relationship to the facility may be re-
quired in certain circumstances under Rule 3-310(B). In
those instances in which this Rule applies, the attorney must,
in addition to informing the client in writing of the nature of
the attorney's relationship with the facility, discuss in writ-
ing how this relationship may adversely affect the attorney's
representation of the client.
53. Id., Op. 477.
1995]
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This opinion discusses and interprets Rules 3-110, 3-300,
and 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct,
and Section 6068 of the California Business and Professions
Code.
3. Opinion No. 47854
A client obtains medical services paid for by a health
plan. Subsequently, an attorney files a lawsuit for personal
injuries on the client's behalf. The attorney thereafter re-
ceives a notice of lien from the health plan and a copy of a lien
acknowledgment form which the client has signed. Upon set-
tlement of the personal injury lawsuit, the client instructs the
attorney to remit the settlement funds to the client, as op-
posed to paying the lien. The attorney remits the funds to the
client, thereafter requiring that the client sign a form ac-
knowledging personal responsibility for the debt. Has the at-
torney acted ethically by remitting the settlement funds to
the client in such a situation, or should the attorney have in-
stead remitted the funds to the lienholder without the client's
consent?
The opinion first notes that under Rule 4-100, the attor-
ney has an obligation to pay to the client funds in the attor-
ney's possession upon the client's request, provided that the
client is entitled to receive the funds. However, the attorney
also has a fiduciary duty towards the third party lienholder.
Because the attorney in the instant factual scenario had re-
ceived both a notice of lien and a copy of a signed lien ac-
knowledgment form, the attorney may be subject to discipline
for violating this fiduciary duty should the funds be remitted
to the client without the lienholder's consent. However, the
attorney may not simply disburse the settlement funds di-
rectly to the health plan, for Rule 4-210 provides that a attor-
ney must receive the client's consent before contested funds
may be disbursed.
It is, therefore, ethically impermissible for the attorney
to disburse the settlement funds in this case to the client or to
the health plan. The opinion states that "several viable op-
tions" remain for the attorney in such a situation, and partic-
ularly identifies two: (1) the attorney may obtain consent
from both the client and the lienholder to hold the funds in
54. Id., Op. 478.
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trust until the dispute is settled, or (2) the attorney may com-
mence a civil action in interpleader.
This opinion discusses and interprets Rules 4-100 and 4-
210 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct.
C. San Diego County Bar Association Ethics Committee
1. Opinion 1993-115
A potential client asks an attorney for advice on how to
protect his or personal assets from existing and identifiable
creditors through a transfer of assets. The attorney is asked
to assist in the creation and utilization of an asset protection
plan designed to prevent creditors from reaching the poten-
tial client's assets. May the attorney do so without acting
unethically?
The opinion notes that Rule 3-210 forbids an attorney
from advising a client to violate any law, rule, or court ruling
unless the attorney believes in good faith that the law, rule,
or ruling is invalid. Therefore, the ethical implications of the
attorney's advice in the instant case depend on whether the
advised action constitutes a legal violation. The Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA")56 states that a asset
transfer is fraudulent if the transfer is made with the intent
to "hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor."57 An attorney who
advised a transfer as is contemplated here would be aiding in
a fraudulent act under the UFTA, and therefore the attorney
would be subject to discipline under Rule 3-210. In addition,
any legal fee charged for providing such advice and assist-
ance would be unconscionable under Rule 4-200.
This opinion discusses and interprets Rules 3-210 and 4-
200 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, Section
6128 of the California Business and Professions Code, Section
3439 et seq. of the California Civil Code, and Sections 154(a)
and 531 of the California Penal Code.
2. Opinion 1993-258
A law firm has represented a client who is charged, and
ultimately convicted, of a serious felony. Subsequently, the
55. S.D. County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1993-1 (1994).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3439.04 (West 1994).
57. Id.
58. S.D. County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1993-2 (1994).
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client is killed by another person. May the law firm represent
the accused murderer of the deceased client? Is it relevant to
this issue that (1) the deceased client was convicted of a vio-
lent crime, and the accused murderer claims self-defense, or
that (2) the firm has no confidential information from the de-
ceased client which will aid in the defense of the murderer?
The opinion states that, under this factual scenario, the
law firm may not ethically represent the accused murderer,
for an attorney's duty of loyalty to the deceased client does
not terminate with the client's death. The conflict of interest
involved cannot be waived, for the former client is unavaila-
ble to consent to the conflict. Though an impermissible con-
flict is most apparent when the deceased client was previ-
ously convicted of a violent crime and the accused murderer
claims self-defense, the law firm could not represent the ac-
cused murderer even if such factors were not present.
The opinion also states that it is not ethically permissible
for the law firm to conclude at the outset that it does not pos-
sess confidential information of the deceased client relevant
to the representation of the accused murderer, because it is
often not possible to judge the significance of information at
the beginning of a case. A law firm which simply assumed it
possessed no confidential information would jeopardize its
duties to both its former and current client.
This opinion discusses and interprets Rule 3-310 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, Section 6068 of the
California Business and Professions Code, and Sections 952,
953, and 954 of the California Evidence Code.
D. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility
Presented below are the central holdings of the formal
opinions issued in 1994 by the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility. Though such opinions obviously
involve the interpretation of ethical rules (the ABA Model
Rules) which are not binding on California practitioners, the
manner in which the Committee resolves ethical dilemmas
may foretell how such issues will be handled under the Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct.
[Vol. 351084
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1. Formal Opinion No. 94-380"9
The limitations imposed by the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct fully apply to attorneys representing a fiduci-
ary in a trust or estate matter. The attorney's obligations to
the fiduciary are not altered merely by the fact that the attor-
ney also may have obligations towards the beneficiaries of the
trust or estate. Nor does that fact impose on the attorneys
ethical obligations toward the beneficiaries that they would
not have toward other third parties. An attorney's obligation
under ABA Model Rule 1.6 60to preserve client confidences is
not changed because the client happens to be a fiduciary.
2. Formal Opinion No. 94-38161
A retainer or employment agreement which prohibits
counsel for a corporation from representing anyone in the fu-
ture against the corporation may not be demanded or ac-
cepted without violating Rule 5.6(a), because such a prohibi-
tion constitutes an impermissible restriction on the attorney's
right to practice.
3. Formal Opinion No. 94-38262
When an attorney receives, unauthorized, an adverse
party's materials, once the attorney becomes aware of the
privileged or confidential nature of the materials, the attor-
ney must refrain from viewing such materials. The attorney
can, however, review the materials to the extent necessary to
determine the manner in which to proceed. The attorney
should either notify opposing counsel, and follow such coun-
sel's instructions regarding the disposition of the material, or
should completely refrain from using the materials until a
court makes a determination as to their proper disposition.
59. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-
380 (LFxs, Ethics Library, ABA Formal Opinion file) (1994).
60. All further references are to the ABA Model Rules unless otherwise
indicated.
61. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-
381 (LExIs, Ethics Library, ABA Formal Opinion file) (1994).
62. Id., Formal Op. 94-382.
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4. Formal Opinion No. 94-38363
Threatening to file a disciplinary complaint against op-
posing counsel in order to obtain an advantage in a civil case
may constitute a violation of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, though the Rules do not expressly prohibit doing so.
The attorney may not use the threat as a bargaining point if
the disciplinary violation of opposing counsel seriously re-
flects on counsel's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as an
attorney. Instead of making threats, the attorney is ethically
required to report such misconduct. A threat used by an at-
torney to obtain a tactical advantage would also be ethically
improper if opposing counsel's misconduct was not related to
the civil claim, if the attorney's disciplinary charges against
opposing counsel are not well founded in fact and in law, or if
the threat has no other purpose or effect than embarrassing,
delaying or burdening opposing counsel or prejudicing the ad-
ministration of justice.
5. Formal Opinion No. 94-38464
When a disciplinary complaint has been filed against an
attorney by opposing counsel in an ongoing matter, the attor-
ney is not ordinarily required nor permitted to withdraw from
representing his or her client solely because of the complaint.
There may be circumstances, however, where the filing of
such a complaint gives rise to the "good cause" necessary to
permit withdrawal. Even if the Model Rules permit a with-
drawal, the attorney must still comply with any additional
limitations mandated by court rules.
6. Formal Opinion No. 94-38565
When an attorney's files and records relating to the rep-
resentation of a current or former client have been subpoe-
naed, or a court order has been obtained for their production,
the attorney has an ethical obligation to attempt to limit the
subpoena or court order on any legitimate available grounds
in order to protect confidential documents.
63. Id., Formal Op. 94-383.
64. Id., Formal Op. 94-384.
65. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-
385 (LExas, Ethics Library, ABA Formal Opinion file) (1994).
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7. Formal Opinion No. 94-38666
An attorney may not cite to a court an unpublished opin-
ion of any court, if the forum court has a specific rule which
prohibits references in briefs to opinions marked by the issu-
ing courts as "not for publication". An attorney may ask per-
mission of the court to cite an unpublished case, but if per-
mission is not expressly granted the attorney must refrain
from presenting the opinion to the court.
8. Formal Opinion No. 94-38767
There is no ethical duty in negotiations for an attorney to
inform the opposing party that the statute of limitations on
the claim of the attorney's client has run. In fact, so inform-
ing the opposing party would constitute a violation of Rules
1.3 and 1.6. If the opposing party and opposing counsel seem
unaware that the statute has run, the attorney cannot dis-
continue negotiations solely on this ground unless the attor-
ney's client consents. It is not unethical for the attorney to
file suit to enforce a claim which is time-barred, unless doing
so is prohibited by rules of the local jurisdiction. Attorneys
representing government agencies are not held to a different
standard regarding any of these circumstances than are at-
torneys representing private clients.
III. CALIFORNIA COURT DECISIONS
A. General Dynamics Corporation v. Superior Court of
San Bernadino County6 8-Implied-in-Fact
Contract and Retaliatory Discharge Claims by
In-House Counsel Against Former
Employer
This case concerned a highly controversial and much-de-
bated issue-whether in-house counsel can pursue a retalia-
tory discharge claim against the former employer. 69 Andrew
Rose was an attorney who began working for General Dy-
66. Id., Formal Op. 94-386.
67. Id., Formal Op. 94-387.
68. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
69. Numerous law review articles discuss this issue. See, e.g., ELLIOT M.
ABRAMSON, Why Not Retaliatory Discharge for Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN. L.
REV. 271 (1991); KENNETH J. WILBUR, Wrongful Discharge of Attorneys: A Cause
of Action to Further Professional Responsibility, 92 Dic L. REv. 777 (1988);
ALFRED G. FELIU, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dis-
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namics in 1978.70 After 14 years with the company, Rose was
abruptly fired. 71 Rose filed a complaint for damages, alleging
that the discharge was the result of his (1) leading an investi-
gation into drug use at General Dynamics' Pomona plant, (2)
protesting the company's failure to investigate the bugging of
the chief of security's office, and (3) advising company officials
that the company's wage policy might be in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.72 General Dynamics filed a de-
murrer to the complaint, asserting that Rose had failed to
state a claim for relief because, as an in-house attorney, he
was subject to discharge at any time for any reason.73
The Court first noted the dramatic increase in the
number of in-house counsel in the last two decades, and noted
that this growth has brought with it "a widening recognition
of the descriptive inadequacy of the nineteenth century model
of the lawyer's place and role in society."74 The Court pointed
out that in-house attorneys do not possess the "significant
measure of economic independence and professional dis-
tance" of law firm partners, and that the economic fate of in-
house attorneys is directly tied to a single employer. 75 In ad-
dition, the Court pointed out that the expansive scope of an
in-house attorney's work, along with the close relationship
between the in-house attorney and his employer, can subject
the in-house attorney to "unusual pressures" to conform to
the employer's wishes. 76
The Court reaffirmed the rule that a client has the right
"to sever the professional relationship at any time and for any
reason."77 Simply because, however, the client has a right to
discharge in-house counsel does not mean that "it may do so
without honoring antecedent contractual obligations to dis-
charge an attorney-employee only on the occurrence of speci-
missal for Acts Within a Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 149 (1979).
70. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 490.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 490-91.
73. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County,
876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 491-92.
77. Id. at 493.
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fled conditions."78 Therefore, if an employer has chosen to
limit its traditional at-will freedom to terminate in-house
counsel, and implied-in-fact limitations on counsel's employ-
ment are found to exist, "no reason appears" why the em-
ployer "should not be held to the terms of its bargain."79 In
addition, because implied-in-fact limitations are purely con-
tractual creations, suits brought by terminated in-house
counsel based on such limitations are unlikely to present is-
sues implicating the unique values of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. 0 Such suits can therefore be treated in the same
manner as implied-in-fact claims brought by nonattorney
employees.81
The Court treated separately the possibility of a retalia-
tory discharge tort claim by in-house counsel. The Court rec-
ognized that other courts have refused to permit such a claim
to be pursued as a result of the unique nature of the attorney-
client relationship.8 2 Yet, the Court felt that it was precisely
because of the attorney's unique position and influence that a
retaliatory discharge tort should be recognized. 83 By provid-
ing in-house counsel with a remedy in tort for "resisting so-
cially damaging organizational conduct, the courts mitigate
the otherwise considerable economic and cultural pressures
on the individual employee to silently conform."84
In contrast to the general approval given to implied-in-
fact contract claims by in-house counsel, the Court set up a
complex framework for adjudication of retaliatory discharge
claims. First, in-house attorneys should have access to a ju-
dicial remedy when they are terminated for adhering to their
mandatory professional duties.8 5 Therefore, the attorney can
receive tort damages if fired for performing a duty required
by an ethical code or statute, or for resisting an employer's
demand to act in a manner clearly forbidden by the ethical
code.86 Second, if the attorney's conduct was not required,
78. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County,




82. Id. at 498-500.
83. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County,
876 P.2d 487, 501 (Cal. 1994).
84. Id. at 501.
85. Id. at 501-02.
86. Id.
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but was merely ethically permissible, the court must deter-
mine (1) whether the termination was such as would give rise
to a retaliatory discharge action by a nonattorney employee,
and (2) whether some statute or ethical rule, such as the stat-
utory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, permitted
the attorney to "depart from the usual requirement of confi-
dentiality with respect to the client-employer" and engage in
the conduct for which the attorney was fired.
8 7
The Court emphasized that its holding with respect to
retaliatory discharge tort claims is of "limited scope".88 The
Court stated that the contours of the attorney-client privilege
should continue to be observed, and that the privilege should
not be diluted for in-house counsel.8 9 It further noted that
trial courts have an wide array of equitable measures at their
disposal which can be used to prevent the former in-house
counsel from disclosing client confidences. 90 In addition,
there are other subsidiary rules which will prevent in-house
counsel from filing suits in bad faith.91 For instance, the at-
torney bears the burden of establishing the relevant ethical
requirements and of showing that the employer was wrong-
fully motivated.92
B. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Association v.
Woodside 9g-County Attorneys' Ability to Sue
Employer/Client Under MPAA
The issue in this case was whether attorneys employed
by Santa Clara County as County Counsel may sue a public
agency under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act ("MMBA). 94
This issue arose in the following factual context. The Santa
Clara County Counsel Attorneys Association ("Association")
refused to accept a wage package offered by the County.
95
The Association instead sought to meet and confer with the
County and its Board of Supervisors in order to argue in sup-
87. Id. at 503.
88. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County,
876 P.2d 487, 503 (Cal. 1994).




93. 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 1994).
94. CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 3500-3511 (1994).
95. Woodside, 869 P.2d at 1145.
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port of its position that its members deserved higher sala-
ries. 96 The Board, however, never responded to the Associa-
tions' repeated attempts to meet and confer.97 Rather, the
Board unilaterally enacted a 4 percent wage increase, which
the Association had previously indicated was not accepta-
ble. 98 Thereafter, the Association filed a formal action seek-
ing, inter alia, a declaration that a petition for a writ of man-
date compelling the County to negotiate over wage issues
does not create a conflict of interest or violate any ethical code
such that the attorneys in the Association would be subject to
discipline. 99 The County cross-complained seeking to enjoin
the Association from filing a petition for writ of mandate. 1°°
The Court first determined that the County attorneys
were local government employees within the scope of the
MMBA's protections, and therefore, the MMBA gave the As-
sociation the statutory right to sue their employer. 10 Never-
theless, the County insisted that this statutory right to sue
must be superseded by the attorney's duty of loyalty towards
a client.10 2 The County further argued that, because the stat-
ute authorizes a violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct by allowing an attorney to sue a client, it constituted a
violation of the constitutional separation of powers by intrud-
ing on the power vested in the judiciary by the California
Constitution to govern the legal profession.
10 3
In order for the MMBA to be ruled unconstitutional on
separation of powers grounds, the Court stated that "a direct
and fundamental conflict" must first be shown between the
operation of the MMBA as it applies to attorneys and attor-
neys' ethical obligations. 10 4 Because the MMBA had already
been found to have authorized the County attorneys to sue
the county, the Court searched to find an ethical or common
law duty for attorneys not to sue their clients. The Court de-
termined that there was no California Rule of Professional
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d
1142, 1145 (Cal. 1994).
99. Id. at 1146.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1147-51.
102. Id. at 1151.
103. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d
1142, 1151 (Cal. 1994).
104. Id. at 1152.
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Conduct which specifically proscribed a suit by an attorney
against his or her client.' 0 5
The Court then turned to the attorney's common law
duty of loyalty. It found that the collective bargaining rela-
tionship between an attorney/employee and a client/employer
was not a per se violation of the duty of loyalty.' °6 Though
such a relationship can create "antagonism" between the at-
torney and client, "such antagonism in the labor relations
context is unfortunately commonplace."'0 7 The determina-
tive question, according to the Court, was whether the attor-
ney had allowed the antagonism to compromise client repre-
sentation. 0 8 The only possible resolution, therefore, was to
permit the attorneys to bring a petition for mandate, while
simultaneously holding the attorneys to "a professional stan-
dard that ensures that their actual representation of their cli-
ent/employer is not compromised." 0 9 The attorneys can
therefore sue their employer so long as they are confining the
dispute to the employer/employee context, and are not al-
lowing it to affect the attorney/client relationship.110
The last issue the Court addressed was whether a client
has the traditionally absolute right to discharge an attorney
regardless of any limitations of that right apparently imposed
by the MMBA. The Court noted that the MMBA prohibits
employers from discharging employees who exercise lawful
employee rights of representation, such as engaging in union
activity."' This conflicted with the absolute power of a client
to discharge an attorney with or without cause, under Code of
Civil Procedure section 284.112 The Court resolved this con-
flict by holding that the MMBA "creates an exception to the
general rule .. .that a client may discharge an attorney at
105. Id. at 1152-54.
106. Id. at 1157.
107. Id. at 1157.
108. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d
1142, 1157 (Cal. 1994).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1157-58. The Court points out that this holding does not mean
that an attorney suit against a present client is generally permissible. In cases
where the attorney is an independent contractor, and no statute exists to pro-
tect the attorney's employment rights, a suit against a client may still subject
the attorney to discipline. Id. at 1158 n.8.
111. Id. at 1159.
112. Id. (citing Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972)).
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will."113 The MMBA, as a later and more specific statute, was
interpreted by the Court to have modified the earlier and
more general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 284.114
C. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty.115-Attorney's
Duty to Advise Client When Attorney Terminates
Representation Due to Conflict of Interest
The facts of this case are simple enough, yet the issue it
presents is deceptively complex. Attorney Donald Hinkle
structured a transaction for William Daniel, in which Daniel
received a two-thirds interest in a steel business. 116 On June
20, 1989, during Daniel's marital dissolution proceeding, a
superior court judge ruled that Daniel's wife had a commu-
nity interest in the steel business. 117 Daniel believed this
outcome was a result of Hinkle's faulty lawyering, and he tel-
ephoned attorney Gail Flatt in order to discuss his grievance
with Hinkle. 1 " On July 27, 1989, Daniel and Flatt had an
hour-long meeting, during which Daniel disclosed confiden-
tial information to Flatt and turned over several documents
to her.119 According to Daniel, Flatt told him during the
meeting that he definitely had a claim for legal malpractice
against Hinkle. 120 In a letter dated August 3, 1989, however,
Flatt informed Daniel that she could not represent him in his
dispute with Hinkle because her firm represented Hinkle's
firm in an unrelated matter.12 1 Daniel put off his search for
another lawyer for a year and a half. 122
On June 3, 1991, Daniel filed suit against Hinkle's firm
as well as against Flatt and the other partners in her firm.1
23
Daniel alleged that Flatt had breached a duty to Daniel in
failing to advise him regarding the statute of limitations
which governed his claims against Hinkle, and in failing to
113. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d
1142, 1160 (Cal. 1994).
114. Id.
115. 885 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1994).
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advise him to seek other counsel to avoid having the claim
become time-barred. 124 Daniel sought damages for legal mal-
practice against Flatt in the event that it was determined
that his claims against Hinkle were barred by the statute of
limitations.125 Flatt moved for summary judgment on the
ground that she owed no duty to advise Daniel, because such
advice would have been contrary to the interests of her client,
Hinkle. 126 Both the trial court and Court of Appeal denied
Flatt's motion for summary judgment, focusing solely on the
question of whether Daniel had, in fact, become a Flatt's
client. 127
The California Supreme Court assumed, for the purposes
of its analysis, that Daniel had in fact become a client of
Flatt's during their brief meeting. 2 ' The Court then ex-
amined conflict of interest principles to determine whether
Flatt had an obligation to give advice to her new client Daniel
upon the severance of representation. 129  The Court ex-
plained that in "successive representation" conflicts, the pri-
mary worry is the possible intrusion upon the former client's
confidentiality, whereas in "simultaneous representation"
conflicts, the primary value implicated is the attorney's duty
of loyalty.13 0 Since the duty of loyalty is such a vital obliga-
tion of an attorney, a mandatory rule of disqualification has
been applied whenever a "simultaneous representation" con-
flict arises.13 '
Not only, the Court stated, does the duty of loyalty re-
quire that an attorney disqualify him or herself from dual
representation, but the duty of loyalty "forbids any act that
would interfere with the dedication of an attorney's entire en-
ergies to [the] client's interests." 32 The giving of any advice
to Daniel in order to advance his lawsuit would constitute an
act that would harm Flatt's existing client Hinkle. 133 There-
124. Id.




128. Id. at 953.
129. Id. at 953-58.
130. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 954-55 (Cal.
1994).
131. Id. at 955.
132. Id. at 958 (quoting Anderson v Eaton, 293 P. 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)).
133. Id. at 958-59.
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fore, "any advice to Daniel regarding the statute of limita-
tions governing his claim against Hinkle would have run
counter to the interests of an existing client of Flatt and her
firm and of their obligation of undivided loyalty to him."
3 4
Consequently, Flatt had no duty to give Daniel such ad-
vice.'13 In addition, Flatt had no duty to advise Daniel to
promptly seek other counsel, for Daniel "obviously knew" that
he had to look for an attorney if he wished to bring his
claim. 136
Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion disagreed with the
majority's reasoning because she believed the majority had
misstated the issue.' 3 7 According to Justice Kennard, Flatt's
duty was the "duty to use the skill, prudence, and diligence
commonly possessed by other attorneys." 38 Because presum-
ably, Daniel had become a client of Flatt's, Flatt assumed a
duty of care towards him.' 39 The dissent stated that it would
be unprecedented to allow Flatt to give preference to the
"first-engaged client" over the "second-engaged client."140 In-
stead, the extent of Flatt's duty to give advice to Daniel is an
issue which should be resolved by expert evidence regarding
an attorney's standard of care in such a situation. 14 Because
no evidence was presented to demonstrate what the proper
standard of care required, Flatt is not entitled to summary
judgment.142
D. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Superior Court 143-Attorney's
Duty to Release Client Property to Former Client
Upon Request As Affected By Work Product
Doctrine
Christensen, White, Miller, Fink and Jacobs ("Christen-
sen") represented Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM") and its
majority shareholders in a merger transaction, and a subse-
134. Id. at 959.
135. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 959 (Cal.
1994).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 961.
138. Id. at 961.
139. Id. at 962.
140. Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 962 (Cal.
1994).
141. Id. at 962-64.
142. Id. at 964.
143. 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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quent bankruptcy proceeding.'4 Years later, MGM, repre-
sented by different counsel, sued the majority shareholders,
alleging that the merger was brought about through the
shareholders' fraud and deception, leaving MGM financially
destitute. 145 The majority shareholders were still repre-
sented by Christensen.146 MGM filed a motion for an order
directing former counsel Christensen to provide it with access
to all files pertaining to the merger and subsequent bank-
ruptcy proceeding.147  Christensen had previously allowed
MGM to review some of the documents, but had refused to
allow it to review, inter alia, attorney notes, writings relating
to factual or legal research, and internal memoranda.
48
MGM insisted that this refusal was unethical, as well as prej-
udicial to MGM because the documents contained essential
information. 49
The Court of Appeal recognized that two "seemingly con-
flicting lines of authority" exist for determining whether an
attorney has a duty to provide all client papers and property
to a former client upon the client's request. 50 One line of au-
thority applies Rule 3-700 of the California Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, and holds that an attorney must turn over all
files of a former client to new counsel. 15 1 The other line of
authority holds that the attorney is the exclusive holder of his
or her "absolute" work product (an attorney's impressions,
opinions, legal research, etc.) for purposes of discovery in liti-
gation. 15 2 There appear to be, therefore, two conflicting "ab-
solutes": the "absolute right of a client to his attorney's work
product", and the "absolute right of an attorney to protect his




148. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 371, 373 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 374.
151. Id. The court cites Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975), Kallen v. Delug, 203 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), and John F.
Matull & Associates, Inc. v. Cloutier, 240 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 374.
152. The court cites Kerns Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 74
(1968), American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561
(1974), Lohman v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1978), Fellows v. Supe-
rior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1980), Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, 192 Cal. Rptr.
104 (1983). Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
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or her impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal research
or theories from disclosure."' 53
Having set up this conflict between two contradictory
lines of authority, however, the court decided that there was
no need to resolve it in the instant case.15 4 This was because
one of Christensen's clients during the merger, the majority
shareholders, already had access to the documents at is-
sue. 155 The court stated that "it is not conscionable to allow
Christensen to use its work product developed in the underly-
ing transaction for the benefit of some of its clients and
against another." 5 6 Therefore, the court held that MGM
must be allowed access to the disputed documents.
157
E. Summary of Other Significant Cases
1. Malpractice Cases
ITT Small Business Fin. Corp. v. Niles'158-In transac-
tional legal malpractice cases, when the adequacy of docu-
mentation is the cause of the dispute, "actual injury" to the
client occurs upon the entry of adverse judgment, settlement,
or dismissal of the underlying action. Therefore, the statute
of limitations under Civil Code section 340.6 is tolled until
such time.
Worthington v. Rusconi 9-For purposes of determining
when the statute of limitations for legal malpractice begins to
run, the point at which attorney-client relationship ends
must be determined from an objective point of view rather
than from the client's subjective viewpoint.
Adams v. Paul' 60 -Concerned the situation where a cli-
ent sues attorney for malpractice after attorney misses stat-
ute of limitations and files late complaint, and defendant
moves for summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds. Statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run
when client suffers "actual harm" through being compelled to
oppose summary judgment motion.
153. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 371, 375 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (citing Roberts v. Heim, 123 F.R.D. 614, 634 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 376.
157. Id.
158. 885 P.2d 965 (Cal. 1994).
159. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
160. 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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2. Criminal Cases
Morrow v. Superior Court of Ventura County' 6 1-Dismis-
sal of residential burglary charges where prosecutor pur-
posely eavesdrops on communications between defendant
and his attorney, and eavesdropping results in the acquisi-
tion of confidential information.
3. Attorney Fee Disputes
Ramirez v. Sturdevant162 -Where there is a conflict of
interest between attorney and client over the negotiation of
attorney's fees as part of a settlement of the client's case, and
there is evidence that the conflict may have affected the final
settlement, the settlement should be examined by an impar-
tial tribunal in order to determine whether the client's inter-
ests have been adequately represented. Burden of proof is
thereafter on the attorney to show that his or her pecuniary
interest did not hinder the proper representation of the
client.
4. Undue Influence by Attorney
Estate of Kathryne J. Auen161-Trial court finding that
attorney exerted undue influence over testator was affirmed.
Court held that presumption of undue influence arises if per-
son alleged to have exerted influence (1) had an attorney-cli-
ent relationship with testator, (2) actively participated in
preparation or execution of will, and (3) benefited thereby.
Proof that the benefit to attorney was "undue" was not re-
quired to trigger presumption.
5. Attorney-Client Privilege
Rockwell International Corp. v. Superior Court164 -A co-
operation clause in third party liability insurance policy re-
quiring insured to cooperate with insurer in event of litiga-
tion does not operate as a contractual waiver of the insured's
attorney-client privilege during litigation between insured
and insurer.
161. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
162. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
163. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
164. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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6. Attorney-Client Relationship
Ronson v. Superior Court165-Triable issues of fact exist
as to whether, where attorney defendants represented lim-
ited partnership, there were attorney-client duties imposed
by public policy on the attorney toward the limited partners.
7. Disqualification of Counsel
Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court 1 6 -Order to
disqualify law firm representing defendant upheld where
firm had retained expert witness who was previously inter-
viewed by plaintiff's law firm, and where witness had dis-
closed confidential information about plaintiff's lawsuit.
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Promega Corp. 167-Former
client unsuccessful in disqualifying former attorney because
it could not be shown that the attorney actually possessed cli-
ent's confidential information, or that the "substantial rela-
tionship" test had been satisfied.
Alchemy II, Inc. v. Yes! Entertainment Corp. 16S-Motion
for disqualification of attorney denied where it is alleged that
attorney had accepted employment while possessing licen-
see's confidential information; attorney not disqualified be-
cause it was not shown that there ever was an attorney-client
relationship between attorney and licensee; attorney defend-
ing licensee's contractual rights not presumed to represent
the licensor as well; attorney may defend copyrights in previ-
ous actions and later seek to limit the scope of the copyrights.
8. Attorney Negligence
Fleming v. Gallegos169-Negligence of two successive at-
torneys in failing to prosecute action for nearly four years
shall not be imputed to the client under discretionary dismis-
sal statutes.
165. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
166. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
167. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10174 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
168. 844 F. Supp. 560 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
169. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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IV. CHANGES TO THE CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
A. New Rule 2-400 (Prohibition of Law Firm
Discrimination)
In 1993, the California Supreme Court approved pro-
posed Rule 2-400 of the California Rules of Professional Con-
duct. This rule became effective on March 1, 1994.
1. Text of Rule 2-400
(A) For purposes of this rule:
(1) "law practice" includes sole practices, law part-
nerships, law corporations, corporate and governmen-
tal legal departments, and other entities which em-
ploy members to practice law;
(2) "knowingly permit" means a failure to advocate
corrective action where the member knows of a dis-
criminatory policy or practice which results in the un-
lawful discrimination prohibited in paragraph (B);
and
(3) "unlawfully" and "unlawful" shall be determined
by reference to applicable state or federal statutes or
decisions making unlawful discrimination in employ-
ment and in offering goods and services to the public.
(B) In the management or operation of a law practice, a
member shall not unlawfully discriminate or knowingly
permit unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, na-
tional origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or disa-
bility in:
(1) hiring, promoting, discharging or otherwise deter-
mining the conditions of employment of any person;
or
(2) accepting or terminating representation of any
client.
(C) No disciplinary investigation or proceeding may be in-
itiated by the State Bar against a member under this rule
unless and until a tribunal of competent jurisdiction,
other than a disciplinary tribunal, shall have first adjudi-
cated a complaint of alleged discrimination and found that
unlawful conduct occurred. Upon such adjudication, the
tribunal finding or verdict shall then be admissible evi-
dence of the occurrence or non-occurrence of the alleged
discrimination in any disciplinary proceeding initiated
under this rule. In order for discipline to be imposed
under this rule, however, the finding of unlawfulness
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must be upheld and final after appeal, the time for filing
an appeal must have expired, or the appeal must have
been dismissed.17
2. Background of Rule 2-400
In 1989, 1991, and 1992, the State Bar Conference of
Delegates approved resolutions in favor of a rule which would
subject attorneys to discipline for discrimination in employ-
ment, partnership and compensation decisions (1989 and
1991) and in the acceptance and termination of clients
(1992).'17 The text of the rules approved by the delegates in
1989 and 1991 differs markedly from the text of the rule
which the Supreme Court ultimately approved. These ver-
sions of the discrimination rule, for instance, did not require,
as does Rule 2-400, that a non-disciplinary tribunal first find
unlawful conduct before discipline can be imposed.
1 7 2 In-
deed, these two versions of the discrimination rule are models
of simplicity-the 1989 rule consisting of one sentence and
the 1991 rule consisting of two.
1 7 3
The State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Conduct disapproved of these versions of the rule, citing
numerous objections.1 74 First, it was noted that the rule as
proposed would require the State Bar to conduct an original
investigation of alleged discriminatory offenses, even through
the Bar did not possess expertise in doing so.175 Second,
there was concern that the rule only focused on discrimina-
tion against attorneys, but not on discrimination against non-
attorneys.1 7 6 Lastly, the Committee felt that the rule was not
170. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-400.
171. Request That the Supreme Court of California Approve Proposed Rule
2-400, History of Formulation of Proposed New Rule 2-400, p. 2. During the
same time period in which an employment discrimination rule was being con-
sidered, the State Bar studied the feasibility of an anti-bias rule. Id. at 2-3.
The anti-bias rule would have prohibited an attorney from threatening, harass-
ing, embarrassing, or impugning any other person on the basis of race, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability. Id., Enclosure 6. The
Board Committee ultimately declined to publish the draft rule for public com-
ment as a result of First Amendment concerns. Id. at 3.
172. Id., Enclosure 3.
173. Id., Enclosure 3.
174. Id., Enclosure 3.
175. Request That the Supreme Court of California Approve Proposed Rule
2-400, History of Formulation of Proposed New Rule 2-400, Enclosure 3.
176. Id.
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designed to protect the public or the attorney-client
relationship. 177
In response to these objections, the rule approved by the
Conference of Delegates in 1992 was significantly altered
from the earlier versions. The rule now required that an "ag-
grieved person" first file a complaint with the California De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing or the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, and that a finding of
cause or no cause be obtained, before a disciplinary proceed-
ing could be initiated by the State Bar.178 In addition, the
new rule prohibited discrimination against both attorneys
and non-attorneys, and protected the public in that it forbade
discrimination in the acceptance or termination of a client.179
Ultimately, the Commission for the Revision of the Rules
of Professional Conduct produced a draft version of Rule 2-
400, which was very similar to the 1992 rule approved by the
Conference of Delegates. 80 Proposed rule 2-400 was pub-
lished for 120-day public comment on August 14, 1992.81
Among the objections to the rule advanced by members of the
public were the following: the rule was useless because ade-
quate legal remedies for discrimination already exist, current
laws are sufficient to protect the public, the rule will have "a
chilling effect on the formation of the attorney-client relation-
ship", the rule will have a disproportionate effect on small
civil rights firms, the rule could force an attorney to represent
a client whose cause the attorney finds morally repugnant,
and the requirement that a previous adjudication of unlawful
conduct be made makes the rule practically worthless..8 2
These objections notwithstanding, the Board of Governors
unanimously adopted proposed rule 2-400 for submission to




179. Request That the Supreme Court of California Approve Proposed Rule
2-400, History of Formulation of Proposed New Rule 2-400, Enclosure 3.
180. Id., Enclosure 6.
181. Id., Enclosure 6.
182. Id. at 4-7.
183. Id. at 7, Enclosure 2. Note that some of the concerns expressed by those
who criticized the proposed rule were also advanced by the Florida Supreme
Court in support of its rejection of a similar rule in Florida. In re Amendments
to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 624 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1993). Among, for
instance, the Florida Supreme Court's objections to the proposed ethical rule
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3. Important Features of Rule 2-400
There are many features of Rule 2-400 which will have a
significant role in the rule's impact on California legal com-
munity. First, before discipline can be imposed upon an at-
torney, the attorney's conduct must be found unlawful by an
appropriate non-disciplinary tribunal of competent jurisdic-
tion.18 4 Until such time, the State Bar cannot initiate any
disciplinary investigation or proceeding.185 The finding of the
tribunal will then constitute admissible evidence of the occur-
rence of discrimination in the disciplinary proceeding. 186
Second, the rule not only applies to attorney actions in
the employment context, but also prohibits discrimination in
the "accepting or terminating representation of any client."'8 7
Consequently, an attorney cannot refuse to accept represen-
tation of a client simply because of the client's race, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability. It
should be noted, however, that discipline cannot be imposed
under the rule unless the attorney action would be unlawful
under "applicable state or federal statutes or decisions mak-
ing unlawful discrimination in employment and in offering
goods and services to the public."1 88 The rule does not, in
other words, expand existing discrimination law.
Lastly, the rule not only prohibits actual unlawful dis-
crimination, but also subjects an attorney to discipline who
"knowingly permits" such discrimination. An attorney
"knowingly permits" unlawful discrimination under the rule
if he or she fails to "advocate corrective action where the
member knows of a discriminatory policy or practice which
results in the unlawful discrimination prohibited in para-
prohibiting employment discrimination by attorneys was that "federal and
state statutes already provided the mechanism for addressing employment dis-
crimination." Id. at 722. In addition, the Court felt that the Florida Bar did not
possess the expertise or resources to adequately investigate, or impose disci-
pline for, such offenses. Id. at 722.
184. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-400, section (C).
185. Id. The State Bar can initiate a disciplinary proceeding after a finding
of unlawful conduct but before an appeal on that finding has been resolved. Id.
However, discipline cannot actually be imposed until the finding of unlawful-
ness is upheld on appeal, the time for filing an appeal has expired, or the appeal
is dismissed. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id., section (B).
188. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-400, section (A)(3).
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graph (B)."18 9 It would seem, for instance, that if an associate
in a large law firm was aware of a partner's conscious prac-
tice of not representing women, the associate would be in vio-
lation of the rule unless he or she brought the matter to the
attention of the partnership.190 Furthermore, the associate
would presumably have to "advocate corrective action" in a
manner reasonably likely to be effective in halting the
discrimination.
B. Standards for Attorney Advertising Under Rule 1-400
The Board of Governors made substantial changes in
1994 to the advertising standards under California Rule of
Professional Conduct 1-400. These standards define the
types of "communications" which are presumed to be unethi-
cal advertising or solicitation. Listed below are the "commu-
nications" newly declared to be presumptively unethical 91:
(1) Advertisements directed to seeking professional em-
ployment for pecuniary gain transmitted to the public by
mail, television, radio, newspaper, magazine which does
not state the name of the member responsible for the
communication. 192
(2) A dramatization unless it contains a disclaimer which
states "this is a dramatization" or words of similar
import. 193
(3) Communications which state or imply "no fee without
recovery" unless they disclose whether or not the client
will be liable for costs.' 94
(4) Communications which state or imply that the attor-
ney can provide legal service in a non-English language
unless the attorney can actually do so or the communica-
tions also state the employment title of the person who
189. Id., section (A)(2).
190. It is possible that the rule was not intended to cover such scenarios.
The author of the Commission draft rule stated that the inclusion of the "know-
ingly permit" language was intended to cover "indirect discrimination through
office managers or others", and "deliberate indifference" or "blind eye" kinds of
cases. Request, supra note 144, Enclosure 6, Attachment H. These statements
appear ambiguous as to the extent to which subordinate attorneys were in-
tended to be subject to discipline for the unlawful discrimination of their
superiors.
191. Note that the summaries provided do not encapsulate every element of
the new standards.
192. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400, Standard (12).
193. Id., Standard (13).
194. Id., Standard (14).
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speaks such language and that the person is not a State
Bar member if such be the case.
195
(5) Unsolicited communications transmitted to the public
directed to seeking professional employment for pecuniary
gain setting forth specific fees or range of fees for particu-
lar services if the attorney in fact charges a greater fee
within 90 days after dissemination. In the case of commu-
nications published in the phone book, legal directories or
in other media not published more than once a year, the
attorney shall conform to the published fee for one year
after publication. 196
Michael Edelman
195. Id., Standard (15).
196. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400, Standard (16).
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